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ABSTRACT 
Design research perspectives may have a great deal of insights to offer 
emergency response researchers. We consider man-made and natural disasters 
as events that often require rapid change to existing institutionalized technical, 
social, and cultural support structure—a fundamental problem for static systems. 
Built infrastructure such as electric power and telecommunications or emergency 
response systems such as fire, police, and National Guard all have static 
information systems that are tailored to their specific needs. These specialized 
systems are typical of those developed as a result of applying traditional 
information systems design theory. They are designed to control domain specific 
variables and mitigate a specific class of constraints derived from a well-
articulated environment with firm application boundaries. Therefore, typical 
mission-critical Information and Communication Infrastructure (ICTI) 
technologies empower knowledge workers with the ability to change current 
environmental events to ensure safety and security. Disasters create situations 
that are challenging for typical designs because a disaster erodes control and 
raises unexpected constraints during an emerging set of circumstances. The 
unpredictable circumstances of disasters demonstrate that current emergency 
response ICTI systems are ill equipped to rapidly evolve in concert to address the 
full scale and scope of such complex problems. A phenomenon found in the 
treatment of trauma victims, the Golden Trauma Time Interval, is generalized in 
this paper to all emergencies in order to inform designers of the next generation 
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ICTI. This future ICTI or “Cyberinfrastructure” can provide the essential 
foundation necessary to dynamically adapt conventional ICTI into a 
configuration suitable for use during disasters. However, Cyberinfrastructure 
will suffice only if it can be sufficiently evolved as an Integrated Information 
Infrastructure (I3 ) that addresses the common sociotechnical factors in these 
domains. This paper describes fundamental design concepts derived from 
interdisciplinary theoretical constructs used to inform the creation of a 
framework to model “complex adaptive systems” (CAS) of which emergency 
response infrastructural systems and I3 are instances. In previous work, CAS 
was synthesized with software architecture concepts to arrive at a design 
approach for the electric power grid’s I3. We will present some of the 
foundational concepts of CAS that are useful for the future design and 
development of a Cyberinfrastructure. The ICTI may exist today in a raw form to 
accomplish the task, but further ICTI design research is required to pinpoint 
critical inhibitors to its evolution. Also, social, organizational, and institutional 
issues pertaining to this research will be highlighted as emergency response 
system design factors needing further consideration. For example, this discussion 
infers a resolution to the basic tradeoff between personal privacy rights and 
public safety. 
INTRODUCTION 
The inability to deliver the appropriate 
data and information to specific knowledge 
workers during or immediately following a 
disaster often results in the needless loss of 
human life. We assert this inability to respond 
is tightly coupled with the inappropriate 
methods and techniques used to design the 
Information and Communication Technologies 
Infrastructure (ICTI) that the key agents utilize. 
In order to develop better methodologies, 
design researchers could benefit from a 
different theoretical framework when 
attempting to solve the problems presented in 
this paper. This research juxtaposes some very 
general constructs such as communication and 
control within the context of large disasters in 
order to show that there is a diminishing 
emergency response capability to respond due 
to inadequate and/or inappropriate ICTI 
designed using conventional information 
system theories. Issues associated with 
organizational forms, institutional forces, 
privacy, and freedom of the citizenry further 
convolute this examination of emergency 
response capabilities. These general constructs 
and issues typically interact, resulting in 
certain common systemic behavior that we 
describe using trauma emergencies, electric 
power blackouts, and examination of a 
possible real-world scenario (given today’s 
independent technological developments). We 
address this lack of appropriate design 
approaches by presenting a broad theoretical 
framework that has been synthesized from 
existing research and observed phenomena. 
The framework can be used for complex 
sociotechnical problems. 
Disasters are man-made or natural 
events that disrupt normal operations of the 
existing technical, social, and cultural support 
structure such as built infrastructure and 
emergency response. These events often 
require that the existing information 
infrastructure be rapidly interfaced so that 
agencies not accustomed to working together 
can now share information. Examples of these 
complex tasks include the integration of 
information systems (IS) supporting the supply 
chain for the first Gulf War or the coordination 
and interaction between NYC utilities after 9-
11. Built infrastructure such as the intermodal 
transportation system, electric power grid, 
natural gas system, Internet, or 
telecommunications networks all have robust 
underlying information infrastructure that is 
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separate from the other infrastructural systems. 
Emergency response systems such as fire, 
police, and National Guard usually have well 
established IS that are tailored to their specific 
needs, but are also difficult to interface 
together if the disaster requires such a 
reconfiguration. Disasters present new design 
challenges because conventional requirements 
are often not applicable due to changing 
domain specific constraints. The unforeseen 
behavior of a disaster tends to erode control 
and raise unexpected constraints during an 
emerging set of circumstances that are only 
partially known in advance.  
Current emergency response systems 
that were designed using a traditional IS 
design notion of firm system boundaries are ill 
equipped to rapidly evolve in concert with 
other IS. These specialized ICTI systems are 
typical of those developed as a result of 
applying traditional information systems 
design theory as described by (Walls, 
Widmeyer and El Sawy 1992). Walls et al. 
“used the name ‘IS design theories’ to refer to 
an integrated prescription consisting of a 
particular class of user requirements, a type of 
system solution (with distinctive features), and 
a set of effective development practices. Thus, 
there are design theories for familiar system 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This interdisciplinary design research is guided by a Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
framework. We use the framework to synthesize disparate concepts in a new approach to 
inform Emergency Response infrastructural systems researchers about design approaches 
intended to reduce complexity associated with many real-world development efforts. Design 
research can be an effective perspective on real-world systems associated with emergencies. 
These design research approaches include the analysis of Information and Communication 
Technology Infrastructure (ICTI) artifacts in order to explain, extend, and/or evolve their 
behavior. The goal of such analysis is to guide current ICTI towards a more robust 
sociotechnical instantiation such as an Integrated Information Infrastructure (I3) and/or a 
technologically advanced and interconnected version of ICTI (i.e., a futuristic 
Cyberinfrastructure). Design research is typically interdisciplinary due to the artifact being 
researched to investigate complex problems. Generally, design research begins with problem 
articulation. This paper’s primary thrust, structure, and contribution are the articulation of a 
complex emergency response related problem in terms of the CAS theoretical framework not 
previously associated with phenomena from various mission-critical domains.  
The paper informs the reader how to conceptualize an extremely large design research 
project; such as  I3 based on sociotechnical constraints arising from powerful stakeholders and 
resulting in ambiguous high-level requirements. We demonstrate how to draw together various 
streams of research within the CAS framework in order to structure the problem arising from a 
particular emergency response phenomenon— the Golden Trauma Time Interval (GTTI). The 
GTTI phenomenon is the concept that during an emergency, a small window of opportunity  
exists in which a trauma victim can be saved if appropriate medical attention is provided. The 
obstruction preventing the utilization of needed resources to avert tragedy is referred to as the  
“Golden Barrier” among emergency personnel. Although coined specifically for medical 
emergencies, this concept may also be generalized to all emergency situations. The paper 
articulates the general case of the phenomenon as a problem that can be somewhat addressed 
through the next generation of I3 as a Cyberinfrastructure design. 
This research contributes to community knowledge by walking through the steps 
necessary to articulate the problem, namely theory justification, suggestions for method 
development, and a future scenario as a mechanism to crystallize aspects of the theory and 
methodological analysis. An architectural approach was leveraged in order to show the full 
cohesive process involved in problem development and articulation. Without this deep 
understanding of design research, many less experienced researchers would not discover the 
correct or valid problem to solve. 
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types, like DSS [Decision Support Systems], 
TPS [Transaction Processing Systems], EIS 
[Executive Information Systems], etc.” 
(Markus, Majchrzak and Les Gasser 2002). 
These types of information systems are the 
result of system analysis practices that 
generate narrowly bounded requirements and 
solutions. Per the resulting requirements, they 
were designed to control domain specific 
variables and mitigate a specific class of 
constraints derived from a well-articulated 
environment. An empirical study (Curtis, 
Krasner and Iscoe 1988) of 17 large software 
design projects revealed: 
• Deep domain-specific knowledge 
applicable to early analysis and design 
phases was woefully lacking, 
• Fluctuating or conflicting system 
requirements always cause problems, and 
• Communication and coordination 
breakdowns often constrain project 
success. 
In addition, their data and behavioral 
study indicated the actual implementation (e.g., 
“writing code”) was not a problem, but 
“understanding the problem is the problem” 
(Curtis, Krasner and Iscoe 1988). These 
insights agree with software engineering 
perspectives and problem articulation research 
in decision sciences (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther 
and Shoemaker 1993). Therefore, more 
theoretically grounded research is needed to 
address the myriad of technical, social, 
psychological, and cultural issues surrounding 
the development and deployment of ICTI 
systems. Also, these ICTI systems must be 
designed malleable due to unexpected domain 
constraints. But, software is notoriously 
“brittle” and prone to failure when configured 
into large systems.  
We generally believe if critical design 
issues can be effectively addressed that 
emerging ICTI will facilitate better utilization 
of the knowledge gained from the analysis of 
phenomena such as those we present later in 
this paper. We present the following vision as 
a focal point for the reader to keep in mind. 
Vision statement: Emergency personnel 
are knowledge workers who will continue 
to rely on real-time information, their 
intuitive understanding of the domain, and 
advanced technology in order to reduce 
risk for the public and mitigate loss of life. 
In the future, these knowledge workers 
will know you (or your spouse, your 
children, your parents, your friends) have 
entered a life-threatening situation the 
moment the threat arises—no matter 
where you (they) are in the world. 
The technology appears to be almost 
prepared so that technologists can offer the 
world this option as the following quote 
supporting the development of 
“Cyberinfrastructure” indicates:  
The combination of wireless LANs, the 
third generation of cellular phones, 
satellites, and the increasing use of 
unlicensed wireless bands will cover the 
world with connectivity enabling both 
scientific research and emergency 
preparedness to utilize a wide variety of 
“sensornets”. Building on advances in 
micro-electronic mechanical systems 
(MEMS) and nanotechnology, smart 
sensors can be deployed widely, will be 
capable of multiple types of detection, and 
can survive for long periods of time. The 
integration of real-time multisensor data 
with data mining across large distributed 
data archives opens further avenues for 
adaptive monitoring/observation, 
situational awareness, and emergency 
response. (Atkins et al. 2003) 
However, it remains to be seen if the 
social, cultural, organizational, and 
institutional barriers can be overcome to 
leverage the technology when it is actually 
ready. This paper attempts to articulate some 
of the inhibitors as we search for an accurate 
problem definition(s). 
There is a need to take advantage of the 
opportunity provided by these emerging 
technologies. New design approaches should 
help capture value from these emerging 
technologies if the appropriate research can be 
done. This revelation is being recognized 
throughout scientific and engineering 
communities, which is evidenced by the U.S. 
National Science Foundation Design Science 
solicitation for grant proposals (NSF 2004). 
Having such an infrastructure that allows for 
immediate response to emergencies and 
therefore results in fewer human lives loss is 
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indeed a valuable safety net. However, what 
would you trade for that safety net? Would 
you trade your privacy, money, and/or 
freedom? Because these systems could easily 
be used for evil as well as good, what ethical 
mandate should accompany the scientific 
investigation of these technologies? These are 
complex and highly controversial questions, 
which this paper will only partially augment. 
The critical design research questions we 
examine in this paper at some length are more 
manageable. How can one design complex 
systems:  
1. to mitigate the impacts of the phenomena 
associated with emergency events; i.e., the 
Golden Barrier? 
2. to conform to a myriad of organizational, 
institutional, social, and technical domain-
specific constraints? 
3. with an enhanced, if not full, awareness of 
domain forces arising from crosscutting 
effects? 
4. to mollify the complexities associated 
with wicked infrastructural problems? 
We will point out in the next section 
that the trauma and electric power data 
indicates there is a temporal correlation 
between emergency response and the eventual 
consequences incurred. In addition, we are 
asserting that the solution to the 
Cyberinfrastructure design problem must 
factor in numerous dynamic constraints to be 
correct. Then we elaborate the problem in 
more depth to present the multifaceted design 
considerations that force an examination of a 
broader theory than currently available to IS 
designers. The theoretical considerations are 
enumerated in the Theory section through the 
presentation of a Complex Adaptive Systems 
(CAS) theoretical framework. The CAS 
framework is useful to reduce systemic 
complexity by facilitating the integration of 
various cross-disciplinary research into a 
cohesive whole. The related research that has 
been integrated for this work is then presented 
to further demonstrate the CAS utility and 
cross-functionality. Characteristics of a 
plausible method to match the theoretical 
framework are presented briefly to substantiate 
the theory’s possible research applicability. To 
connect our Vision Statement, aforementioned 
phenomena, theory, and real problems, 
emergency medical services are contextualized 
with some historical background prior to 
presenting a brief design example. This 
futuristic emergency response scenario is used 
to piece together the puzzle formed by 
communication, control, GTTI, infrastructure, 
architecture, and generic emergency events 
through a Cyberinfrastructure analysis 
premised on the previously suggested method. 
The case also draws out salient issues 
confounded with morals and ethics that must 
be addressed when designing systems through 
the weighing of human life and personal 
freedoms or privacy.  The paper will then be 
summarized and the final section will lay out 
recommendations for future research and 
conclusions. 
ELABORATING ON THE PROBLEM 
The domain drives the choice of theory 
in our research because of the strong influence 
domain constraints have on the evolution of 
ICTI with respect to mission-critical 
infrastructure. In this case, built or urban 
infrastructure is the primary domain constraint 
since it has to be evolved due to economic 
constraints and cannot be simply replaced. 
Markus further points out that the expanded 
meaning of infrastructure is “the structure 
within” (Markus 1984). Therefore, when her 
definition is applied to organizational systems, 
the term refers to “both tangible equipment, 
staff and applications and the intangible 
organization, methods and policies by which 
the organization maintains its ability to 
provide system services” (page 148) implying 
an inseparable relationship. The Markus 
definition is very consistent with field 
observations in energy utilities (Klashner 2002) 
and Reddy’s observation of trauma centers 
(Reddy, Dourish and Pratt 2001). In order to 
further demonstrate these domain drivers and 
symbiotic organizational relationships, certain 
domain phenomena will be presented next that 
shows a level of organized complexity, which 
will be revisited later, in the theory section. 
DOMAIN SPECIFIC PHENOMENA 
The loss of system control often 
coincides with the erosion of system structure 
creating a set of phenomena associated with an 
emergency event. Several large mission-
critical infrastructural systems and emergency 
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response industries share certain 
characteristics that are tied to the lack of 
accurate information delivered in a timely 
fashion. To further ground this discussion, we 
present concrete real-world cases before 
continuing with the theoretical research 
aspects of this paper. 
Severe Trauma 
“’The first 60 minutes following an 
accident largely dictate whether a 
critically injured person will live or die.’ 
Dr. R Adams Cowley (Cowley 1976) the 
pioneering Maryland trauma surgeon, is 
often credited with coining the term, ‘The 
Golden Hour of Trauma’. It is important 
to realize that he did not mean that a 
discreet 60 minute time interval elapses 
from the time of injury until the onset of 
irreversible shock or death.” (CWDMG 
2003) 
We assert the properties of the GTTI 
are common to all sizable emergency response 
situations. 
A small window of opportunity exists in 
which a trauma victim can be saved if 
appropriate medical attention is provided. 
This concept of a Golden Trauma Time 
Interval is further elaborated in Figure 1 
(CWDMG 2003). This temporal 
window—the GTTI—is of the gravest 
importance. However, much of the GTTI 
is wasted in locating the victim and initial 
analysis. Therefore, this barrier is 
“golden” because it greatly influences the 
severity of the event. Note how the lack of 
information and attention drastically 
changes the severe trauma scenario and 
the outcome of the GTTI event in Figure 1. 
Notification of the occurrence of an 
incident and attention to the appropriate 
resource allocation are literally the 
difference between life and death. Of all 
trauma victims, approximately 30-50% 
perish due to lack of timely care or 
appropriate technology during a given 
GTTI when it is required. So, to what 
degree does societal dependency on the 
control infrastructure, and the emergency 
response system structure contribute to 
higher than necessary fatalities? It is 
difficult to say because of scarcity of data 
due to its sensitive nature (i.e., medical,
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Figure 1. The Visual Representation of the Golden Trauma Time Interval (GTTI) 
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national security, etc.). However, what is even 
more compelling is that the GTTI phenomenon 
can be generalized to most man-made and 
natural disasters. Generally, the GTTI 
phenomenon can be attributed to the same 
control-structure dynamic observed in the 
electric power grid (described below). It is 
therefore important to examine this 
relationship further. 
Electric Power Domain 
The electric power industry evolved 
over the last century and its integrated 
information infrastructure (I3) (Klashner 2002) 
is the culmination of four decades of evolution. 
The real time, mission-critical, and ubiquitous 
characteristics of this industry magnify domain 
complexity arising from the sheer size of the 
system. For example, electric power grid 
operators control the flow of electricity over 
thousands of square miles and to millions of 
customers. Both antiquated and cutting edge 
technologies coexist and interact to provide the 
necessary services through I3. The 
development and operation of I3 for the 
electric power industry establishes a distinct 
domain of interest. Interactions between 
domain entities and I3 result in domain-
specific system behavior. In other words, the 
electric power grid behaves in a particular 
manner because of the I3 it is utilizing, which 
includes the social and intangible ramifications 
inferred in the Markus definition of 
infrastructure. The electric power domain is 
very complex necessitating the use of complex 
research tools to gain intellectual leverage over 
the problem’s breadth and depth. The I3 
designer often uses an abstraction such as 
architecture to gain intellectual control over 
complex domain data. There exists a natural 
relationship between the concepts of 
infrastructure and architecture, which often 
have a great deal of design overlap, socially 
constrained juncture, or even common 
physical components. A great number of 
various architectural abstractions exist, but 
software architectures are particularly relevant 
for developing I3 (Klashner 2002). The high 
architectural level of abstraction coincides 
with the view of the electric power grid system 
from the grid dispatch center—their command 
and control center. As one informant at grid 
dispatch phrased it, they have the “view from 
30,000 feet” (Klashner 2002).  
The electric power grid is typically very 
stable in the US; i.e., a normal state of 
economic dispatch. However, the electric 
power grid does experience state changes. A 
state change event in electric power would be 
a power line fault or generator malfunctioning, 
which would effectively change the grid 
frequency. When system faults occur, the grid 
state changes to a brownout (i.e. reduced 
voltage or supply pattern for a geographical 
area) or blackout (i.e. complete loss of voltage 
for a given area). The large blackout in the 
Western United States in 1995 was physically 
the result of harmonics building up in the grid 
system over a period of several weeks. A 
series of unforeseen circumstances and events 
in the mountain states rapidly escalated the 
situation until a fault caused by a tree touching 
a high-voltage wire started a cascading failure. 
The rolling failure lasting a few minutes 
created a brownout condition throughout the 
West Coast and complete blackout in Arizona. 
However, the blackout had social and political 
causes as well as technical causes. Grid 
dispatch experts often understand the nature of 
an emergency through intuition. But 
deregulation has confused their traditional 
domain understanding and diluted the 
effectiveness of their organizational memory 
by introducing additional high-level 
abstractions and ambiguity primarily 
associated with the politics of electric power, 
thereby making the problem even more 
intractable. 
Prior to the 2003 blackout in the 
Northeast United States, the electric power 
grid began behaving irregularly indicating 
electric power grid operators were losing 
control of the system (Ellis 2003). The final 
report by the joint U.S. and Canadian task 
force investigating the blackout determined the 
“Loss of Eastlake 5, however, did not initiate 
the blackout. Rather, subsequent computer 
failures leading to the loss of situational 
awareness in FE’s [FirstEnergy] control room 
and the loss of key FE transmission lines due 
to contacts with trees were the most important 
causes” (Ellis 2003).  
This lack of “situational awareness”, in 
both the West Coast and Northeast blackouts, 
is effectively the capability of command and 
control personnel to manage knowledge based 
on a plethora of continuously replenished 
information and data, which is delivered to 
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their control center via the ICTI. As a direct 
result of these failures, large geographical 
regions disconnected and/or had voltage 
collapse coinciding with the rapid erosion of 
the grid structure. The dependence on ICTI 
(i.e., no manual mechanisms) and the absence 
of appropriate sensors in conjunction with a 
shared knowledge base contributed to these 
blackouts. These factors combine to work 
against the command and control personnel.  
In addition to proactive situational awareness 
to prevent emergencies, similar ICTI 
mechanisms should be applied reactively to 
any emergency response situation.  
MULTIFACETED DESIGN 
CONSIDERATIONS 
There is a great deal of overlap between 
the concepts of a Cyberinfrastructure (Atkins 
et al. 2003) and the earlier I3 conceptualization, 
but Cyberinfrastructure as presented by Atkins 
et al neglects some of the concerns voiced by 
Klashner such as the inclusion of the Markus 
intangibles. Therefore, we have chosen to 
expand the definition of Cyberinfrastructure 
here to include aspects of I3 to demonstrate the 
utility of having more degrees of freedom with 
respect to sociocultural aspects of information 
infrastructure design. Thus, our 
Cyberinfrastructure design recommendations 
will be augmented with some of the 
foundational concepts used in I3 design. The 
general research we are proposing to address 
the aforementioned questions should focus 
design on both Cyberinfrastructure and I3 
conceptual issues because a critical 
intersection between the concepts revolves 
around the nontechnical aspects of 
requirements for these systems. In both 
instances, a variety of domain constraints 
translate into somewhat intractable, but 
important “high-level requirements” that 
directly effect design considerations. To make 
this point more salient, we introduce the 
research by King (King et al. 1994; Forster 
and King 1995; Pickering and King 1995; 
King, Grinter and Pickering 1997) into "high-
level requirements analysis.” 
King et al focus on issues of 
organizational and institutional usability that 
have created difficulties for software designers 
and software developers. The problem inherent 
in the design of complicated sociotechnical 
information infrastructures is that they must 
function effectively in complex organizational 
and institutional settings. Their research of 
high-level requirements is set in highly 
institutionalized production sectors that are 
affected in dramatic ways by the regulatory 
and influential efforts of social institutions, 
both formal (e.g., Federal policy-makers), and 
informal (e.g., professional associations). 
Infrastructural systems investigated by King et 
al include: control of electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution resources in 
deregulated markets; communication IS for 
intermodal logistics and transport; signaling 
and addressing systems in global common-
carrier wireless networks; case management 
systems in criminal courts; patient record 
systems in health care; systems for curricular 
education in "distance learning" in higher 
education. Baldwin states the problem of 
business strategies and government policies 
designs for innovation and technology in the 
following manner: 
Compounding this problem is the fact that 
many social scientists, business leaders 
and policy makers misunderstand the 
nature of designs and design processes in 
fundamental ways. For example, many 
believe that the process of creating a large, 
complex design is rational, orderly, and 
deterministic. Designers and others close 
to the actual processes know that such 
processes are creative, messy, and have 
highly uncertain outcomes. It is a fact that 
uncertain and open-ended processes 
require radically different institutions, 
organizations and incentives from 
deterministic processes: the factory 
approach will not work for designs. 
(Baldwin 2003) 
The compounding of domain 
constraints and high-level requirements, as 
noted above, interact in a complex manner 
resulting in a “wicked problem”(Rittel and 
Webber 1973). Wicked problems do not have 
solutions, only best possible resolutions. This 
complexity is especially apparent in the area of 
command and control center design (Klashner 
2002) where emergencies must be resolved 
based on large quantities of data interpreted by 
experts.  
These concepts can be summarized as 
follows: External domain and internal 
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structural constraints interact through 
organizational and institutional associations 
resulting in high-level requirements that often 
lead to system development failure. The 
situation is further confounded in mission-
critical infrastructural domains required for 
emergency response wherein the design of 
information systems infrastructure necessary 
to operate is obfuscated by social factors not 
easily explicated by traditional IS or software 
engineering design approaches that focus on 
an application domain. The interplay across 
these concepts throughout the infrastructure 
also create crosscutting effects that surface as 
domain considerations and must be resolved 
during architectural and/or design decision-
making depending on the scope or level of 
system abstraction. Drawing arbitrary 
application domain boundaries or creating 
abstract models in order to exclude these 
crosscutting effects results in the creation of 
more complex problems that must be 
addressed later in the evolution of the system. 
This dynamic was observed in the deregulation 
of the US electric power industry (Klashner 
2002; Klashner 2004). This is especially true 
in California where over $20 billion was lost 
due to inappropriate deregulatory efforts 
founded on a particularly flawed IS design 
exploited by Enron (Swartz 2003). Therefore, 
this sort of “wicked” problem (Rittel and 
Webber 1973) can be attacked in a broad 
Cyberinfrastructure/I3 design context. In 
answering the research questions presented 
earlier, this paper further articulates all of the 
prior aspects as a “wicked” design problem in 
order to enumerate some of the more tangible 
constraints and tradeoffs. We elaborate on an 
initial Cyberinfrastructure design theoretical 
framework in the next section that we envision 
as necessary to provide emergency response 
capabilities to society.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The general problem in the prior 
section noted how organizational, institutional, 
social, and technical crosscutting effects 
complicate already difficult mission-critical 
infrastructure design problems. These 
infrastructures are necessary for emergency 
preparedness and response. These difficulties 
necessitate the use of theory to provide 
guidance throughout complex design tasks 
inherent within the wicked problem of 
designing ICTI to address such phenomena as 
the Golden Barrier. Typical information 
systems are already a critical component of all 
mission-critical infrastructures. The integration 
of IS infrastructure to form the ubiquitous 
nature of Cyberinfrastructure (Atkins et al. 
2003) create design difficulties for IS 
researchers. In the past, application definitions 
and boundaries were imposed in order to gain 
intellectual mastery over the complexity in the 
problem domain (Walls, Widmeyer and El 
Sawy 1992). That is, ‘IS design theories’ as 
defined by Walls et al adhere to a particular 
class of user requirements, and a type of 
system solution (e.g., DSS, TPS, EIS) in order 
to assure success, defining away the problem 
complexity through specific 
conceptualizations. However, even if these 
conceptualizations helped designers, the true 
high-level requirements are obscure (as noted 
above), and since the problems are “wicked” 
there is no absolute solution. So, traditional IS 
design theories do not provide representational 
sufficiency or intellectual mastery over the 
problems and are not generally applicable to 
Cyberinfrastructure designs.  
There exists a strong correlation 
between the complexity of built infrastructure 
design, the domain, and the apparent 
wickedness of the problem. In other words, the 
role of the environment should be considered 
when assessing the impacts of complexity on 
the design. Definitions of complexity  (e.g., 
Santa Fe Institute versions) often include 
convoluted mathematical descriptions of little 
practical benefit to IS designers. Other 
definitions utilize controversial or abstruse 
notions such as postmodernism (Cilliers 1998). 
Complexity experts feel that a precise 
definition of complexity is unlikely in the near 
future (Axelrod and Cohen 2000). Some 
descriptions of domain complexity are 
primarily concerned with sociocultural 
domains; e.g., Jackson's “informal” domain 
(Jackson 1995). Also, apparent complex entity 
behavior over time does not necessarily have a 
direct causal association with internal entity 
complexity (Simon 1995). To make this point 
about environment, Simon describes the semi-
random path an ant would follow on the beach 
resulting from domain interdependencies 
(pages 63-66). We believe his illustration is 
somewhat analogous to sociocultural domain 
constraints guiding the design of infrastructure 
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through policy-making. The resulting 
convoluted design is not an engineering 
derivative, but a product of the sociotechnical 
political process. 
The scale and scope of these design 
difficulties necessitates the utilization of 
theory that has an intellectual foundation 
capable of managing all aspects of 
sociocultural complexity, wicked problem 
definition, and behavioral diversity. Leveson 
argues that science and engineering were 
making good progress toward a science of 
design up until the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
but have “started all going down one narrow 
path…without much regard for complexity, 
intellectual manageability, or many of the 
principles derived in the 70’s” (Leveson 2003). 
She further asserts that a science of design 
“must” include “understanding the many 
aspects of complexity; go beyond simple 
hierarchical decomposition and create design 
principles and concepts based on systems 
theory [emphasis added], including the 
principle of emergence; and explore such 
topics as the relationship between human 
cognitive limits (intellectual 
manageability)…” To address these same 
difficulties found in the electric power industry, 
Klashner utilized a theoretical framework for 
sociocultural systems (Buckley 1967; Buckley 
1998), which was strongly influenced by 
general systems theory. The framework was 
developed to model “complex adaptive 
systems” (CAS) and had been derived from 
several disciplines. Klashner synthesized CAS 
and software architecture concepts to arrive at 
a design approach for the electric power grid’s 
integrated information infrastructure (Klashner 
2002). We will present some of the 
foundational concepts of CAS below for later 
use in the presentation of Cyberinfrastructure 
design method recommendations.  
The “modern systems theorists” from 
the 1950s and 1960s had tightly coupled the 
concepts of organization, information, control, 
and communication (all of which will be 
enumerated in the following case). The 
environment can be viewed as a "set” or 
“ensemble" of elements, states, or events that 
are to some degree distinguishable based on 
spatial relations, temporal relations, or 
properties (Buckley 1967). These 
distinguishable differences are generally 
regarded as "variety". Buckley extended those 
peculiar organizational concepts to assert that 
CAS elements were almost entirely linked by 
the intercommunication of information rather 
than through some other mechanism, such as 
energy or inherent structure, as with many 
other popular sociological approaches of his 
time. The term "organized complexity" 
(Buckley 1967) (pp 38); which he extracted 
from (Rapoport and Horvath 1959), to define a 
"collection of entities interconnected by a 
complex net of relations". Within the 
framework, every entity has some degree of 
organization—albeit relative—that lie between 
two organizational extremes represented by 
the ideal constructs presented next.  
The first construct is called “organized 
simplicity”. Organized simplicity "is a 
complex of relatively unchanging components 
linked by a strict sequential order or linear 
additivity, without closed loops in the causal 
chain." Buckley’s second extreme 
organizational construct is “chaotic 
complexity”. Chaotic complexity refers to "a 
vast number of components that do not have to 
be specifically identified and whose 
interactions can be described in terms of 
continuously distributed quantities or gradients, 
as in statistical mechanics." In other words, 
Buckley constructs a continuum wherein all 
conceptual definitions of organization may fall. 
The continuum formed between 
organized simplicity and organized complexity 
as endpoints was synthesized by Buckley with 
the help of Norbert Wiener’s (Wiener 1956) 
“notion” of “contingency” (pp 82). This 
combination of an organizational continuum 
and contingency introduces dynamism by 
integrating complex adaptive organization into 
preexisting theory. In other words, if all things 
are necessary and nothing is contingent, no 
significant concept of organization can be 
arrived at, but with contingency comes degrees 
of organization lying between organized 
simplicity and chaotic complexity. Based on 
(Ashby 1962), Buckley also asserted relatively 
stable spatial, causal, and/or temporal relations 
between elements or events are considered to 
be "constraints". Chaotic complexity is 
complete lack of constraint and organized 
simplicity is the presence of maximum 
constraint. Typically, stable causal 
relationships exhibit a high degree of 
constraint. 
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The third key concept, in addition to 
“contingency” and “constraint” used by 
Buckley to explicate complex organization, is 
“degrees of freedom in the interrelation of 
parts” (pp. 83). When no freedom of choice 
exists, the system is in a state of maximal 
organization. Inversely, when complete or 
absolute freedom of choice exists a state of 
systemic chaos exists. So, constraint and 
degrees of freedom are dynamic constructs 
that describe a complex adaptive systems’ 
relation to a changing set of contingencies. 
This dynamic results in the organizational state 
of the system that informs the designers of 
information systems during the integration 
activities, which are representative of CAS 
evolution. Designers seek to maximize their 
control of this process by maximizing their 
understanding of the current set of available 
contingencies, constraints, and degrees of 
freedom at their disposal in order to reduce 
risk. IS designers are thus seeking as much 
relevant information as possible, which is 
important for another aspect of CAS. 
Buckley connects the aforementioned 
organizational concepts to a type of 
information theory that provides a 
“generalized logical framework for the 
discussion of symbolic intercommunication” 
(pp. 84); i.e., it is not of the signal coding and 
transmission type. Generally, an information 
theory starts with a set of continuous signals, 
symbols, or messages generated by a source in 
various patterns. When maximal organization 
exists, no variety is present, which is the same 
as negative entropy per Buckley’s analysis of 
information theory. If environmental “variety” 
exists, it must be converted into information in 
order to have meaning for the receiving entity 
(e.g., the IS designer). The conversion process 
includes recognizing and selecting a subset of 
the variety, then "mapping" the environmental 
variety and constraints into its own organized 
structure and/or information. For example, 
living creatures acquire, organize, and 
incorporate information that facilitates their 
survival in particular environments through 
genetic alteration during evolution. Therefore, 
part of the receiving entity and the 
environment become isomorphic with respect 
to the subset of variety that is freely chosen 
during evolution. This process is basically 
communication of the original variety and its 
associated constraints in a manner that remains 
somewhat invariant between transmitting and 
receiving elements (Buckley 1998). 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
SUMMARY AND APPLICABILITY TO 
EMERGENCIES 
CAS has been briefly described using a 
behavioral sociocultural framework developed 
by Buckley in order to facilitate its 
applicability to emergency situations. Since 
Buckley’s work was a synthesis of a large 
body of interdisciplinary research that mapped 
into the General Systems umbrella, only the 
essence of the CAS framework has been 
presented. The essence of this design 
framework applies to complex systems 
wherein a set or ensemble of elements, states, 
or events are distinguished based on variety 
associated with spatial and temporal relations 
through concepts of information, control, and 
communication within an organizational 
continuum bounded by organized simplicity 
and chaotic complexity. Ensemble or set 
members also have properties of varying types 
that contribute to their ability to be contingent 
or to constrain other systemic elements, states, 
or events within given interrelated degrees of 
freedom, thereby factoring into organizational 
state. The CAS framework can guide the 
utilization of other broadly or narrowly 
defined theories and methods because it is an 
“integrationist” framework (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979) developed to research emergent 
phenomenon. For example, to draw out 
diverging aspects of co-located mission-
critical infrastructure one may choose to utilize 
discourse as a methodological tool (Ulrich 
2001) to tease out integration issues and 
further specify meanings associated with terms 
such as information since Ulrich relies on 
rigorous semiotic approaches. 
 Emergent circumstances are reflected 
in the GTTI phenomenon described earlier 
wherein control-structure relationships are 
critical. Large systems such as infrastructure 
or networks of emergency response resources 
have extensive stand-alone IS that can be 
separately evolved under normal situations 
using conventional IS design theory (Walls, 
Widmeyer and El Sawy 1992). Although we 
agree with a great deal of what Gasson 
asserted (e.g., much of design science is 
currently misplacing the emphasis on arbitrary 
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objectives) (Gasson 2003), we disagree that 
“sociocultural work and technology-
interaction are incommensurable” because 
CAS is fundamentally a sociocultural 
theoretical perspective we have found to 
resonate with many technical design 
perspectives such as the software architecture 
process metaphors (Klashner 2002). Thus, the 
CAS theoretical perspective permits reuse of 
specialized theories such as DSS, EIS, etc. 
within the conceptual framework for normal 
design and evolution. Institutional or social 
stimuli (e.g., deregulation of the electric power 
industry or a large-scale terrorist act) creates 
the need to rapidly integrate these systems into 
a cohesive whole to adapt the general system 
for the emergency situation(s) at hand. The 
typical IS theory is not equipped for that sort 
of dynamic integration because it is not the 
status quo. Using CAS as the theoretical 
design framework, one would reinterpret the 
status quo as existing systemic constraints 
arising from institutionalized entities and 
process maintaining maximal organization by 
exerting legitimate power to control the degree 
of freedom of choice with respect to the set of 
possible contingency states.  
We propose designing emergency 
response systems within the CAS theoretical 
framework in a manner that they will not be 
abandoned during an emergency, but instead 
evolve dynamically based on the emergent 
phenomenon represented by the variety 
received via the dispersed infrastructural or 
emergency network nodes. We concur with 
Turoff that for IS to be beneficial and utilized 
during an emergency it must be a version of 
the systems used on a daily basis (Turoff, 
Chumer, Van de Walle, and Yao 2004), but 
must also be able to dynamically evolve into 
an integrated form with other IS in order to 
effectively manage event variety. The next 
section describes some basic building blocks 
that were derived by Klashner from the CAS 
framework (Klashner 2002) we will utilize to 
present possible methods. 
RELATED RESEARCH 
The related work presented in this 
section adds concepts, background, and 
information from several disciplines for use 
within the CAS framework. Since the problem 
is “wicked” (Rittel and Webber 1973) and the 
domain complex, triangulation of related 
research is intended to facilitate an 
understanding of the general systems 
theoretical underpinning from which CAS was 
derived. This related work would also be 
needed to fully understand the scenario 
presented later. In addition, several of the 
more technical research concepts were 
synthesized into CAS (Klashner 2002) in order 
to map the CAS principles into a software tool 
for use by stakeholders such as IS designers, 
software architects, and nontechnical agents in 
the electric power industry. 
Mission-critical built infrastructure 
such as electric power, telecommunications, 
and air traffic control rely heavily upon 
software and information systems to operate 
(Arango 1989; Wets 1991; Denning 1992; 
Oreizy, Medvidovic and Taylor  1998; Boehm 
and Sullivan 2000; Salasin 2001; Klashner 
2002; Markus, Majchrzak and Gasser 2002). 
The Internet provides a great deal of capability 
such as exemplified when it facilitated the 
deregulation of the electric power industry 
(FERC 1996), but the Internet is not the 
complete solution for all problems (Oreizy, 
Medvidovic and Tayler 1998; Boehm and 
Sullivan 2000). Integration of technology is 
important, such as for Air Traffic Control 
(Wets 1991). Satellites orbiting the earth form 
an important infrastructure for security and 
Global Positioning Systems. However, the 
growing dependence on software and 
information systems raises concerns about 
security vulnerabilities (Boehm and Sullivan 
2000). The result is countermeasures such as 
the use of cryptography by the US National 
Security Agency (Denning 1992). The military 
utilizes a wide variety of software 
infrastructure for their “Knowledge-centric 
Operations” (Salasin 2001). Built 
infrastructure can be supported with the 
appropriate reusable software infrastructure 
design (Arango 1989), but enhancing and 
propagating these relationships will be the 
focus of much research in the future (Atkins et 
al. 2003). To evolve the infrastructure through 
software component reuse, “a reusable 
infrastructure” also needs to be designed 
(Oreizy, Medvidovic and Taylor 1998). 
The software and information systems 
comprising the supporting computational 
infrastructure can be architecturally 
conceptualized as an Integrated Information 
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Infrastructure (I3) (Klashner 2002) or 
Cyberinfrastructure (Atkins et al. 2003). “The 
newer term cyberinfrastructure refers to 
infrastructure based upon distributed computer, 
information and communication technology” 
(Atkins et al. 2003). The Cyberinfrastructure 
can be conceptually abstracted as software 
architectures (Tracz 1988; Perry and Wolf 
1992) or information system architectures 
(Zachman 1987). Depending on the discipline 
and level of engagement, architectural 
representations can capture business 
scope/objectives, business model, elements, 
forms, constraints, user functional and 
nonfunctional requirements, and abstract 
design rationale. The interface with the user is 
a significant architectural issue as well (Taylor 
and Coutaz 1994; Taylor, Medvidovic, 
Anderson, Whitehead and Robbins 1996).  
A common means of leveraging the 
architectural metaphor is through software 
architectural styles that focus on component-
connector abstractions rather than lines of 
program code (Tracz 1988; Perry and Wolf 
1992). Nontechnical stakeholders can more 
easily interpret stylistic views that are 
generated based on the captured data. The 
Representational State Transfer (REST) 
architectural style was used to design the 
Internet that “has succeeded in large part 
because its software architecture has been 
designed to meet the needs…” (Fielding and 
Taylor 2002). The C2 architectural style 
supports the graphical user interface design 
requirements of applications (Taylor, 
Medvidovic, Anderson, Whitehead and 
Robbins 1996).  
Domain Specific Software Architecture 
(DSSA) (Tracz, Coglianese and Young 1993; 
Taylor, Tracz and Coglianese  1995) grew out 
of the recognition that within specific domains 
(e.g. fighter aircraft) certain architectural 
design considerations are consistent. A DSSA 
is typically augmented with reference 
architecture and standardized requirements 
that are consistently reusable within the 
specific domain. The DSSA should be flexible 
and extensible to augment future technology. 
The DSSA encapsulates and expresses 
relationships that facilitate the implemented 
system’s tolerance to change. The flow of 
control and data are more tightly defined in a 
DSSA because of the domain constraints being 
multilateral. Temporal events and component 
interconnections are described in a DSSA 
within a context of legacy systems and 
dominant standards for the domain, which 
form a constraint set easily mapped within 
CAS.  A fundamental CAS concept 
necessitates the analysis of domain specific 
resources. Therefore, some of the resources 
relevant for a Cyberinfrastructure to support 
dynamic EMS are enumerated next.  
Resources that are conceptualized as 
multifunctional equipment are a logical 
extension for the scenario presented here, 
given the increasingly popular approaches by 
firms to make devices multitasking (e.g. 
Sony’s PlayStation that plays games and 
DVDs). These devices often function in a 
control, communication, organizational, or 
informational capacity, which is relevant to an 
analysis of emergency response systems using 
CAS. Domain-specific examples include: a 
low-level unconventional CPU design 
transfers the decision of what application 
algorithm to run from the CPU (Ziavras 2003), 
or smart electric power meters communicate 
across the existing building power 
infrastructure to collect, store, and transmit 
detailed electrical consumption and system 
monitoring information using data encryption 
(Echelon 2001). Also, JavaTM language 
technologies were originally designed for the 
“convergence of digitally controlled consumer 
devices and computers” 
(http://java.sun.com/features/1998/05/birthday.
html), but not the wide-scale utilization on the 
Internet. However, JavaTM technologies are 
now showing dramatic growth (Chen 2004) 
and fostering ubiquitous computing for the 
software “infrastructure products” (e.g. PDA), 
thereby becoming a fundamental enterprise 
communication medium (McMillan 2001) 
demonstrating the emergent phenomena one 
would expect within a CAS (Buckley 1967; 
Buckley 1998).  
Other examples of “smart appliances” 
may include the vehicles we use every day.  
The OnStar™ (www.onstar.com) system is 
becoming more popular with many car 
manufacturers integrating the service in new 
vehicles.  The system employs a GPS receiver 
in the vehicle and a wireless modem and voice 
connection.  Using the modem, the OnStar call 
center can download the exact location of the 
vehicle as well as remotely control aspects of 
the vehicle (such as unlocking the doors). Self-
Robb Klashner and Sameh Sabet 
 72 
aware information and communication 
technology and ubiquitous data collection 
implies many larger resource constraint issues 
that overlap social concerns. Inferences about 
unethical and immoral abuses of resources to 
gain or maintain illegitimate power are easily 
imaginable. All of these issues must be 
considered when creating an architectural 
design.   
METHODOLOGICAL EXPECTATIONS 
The methods described here are a 
derivative from CAS and the synthesized 
intellectual concepts from the applicable 
research just described, since the CAS 
framework integrates these diverse 
perspectives. Domain variety should be 
captured using appropriate quantitative or 
qualitative data collection methods. The data is 
then classified into constraint types since 
constraint is essential to CAS analysis. Note, 
the capture and articulation of domain variety 
as constraint categories are not the most 
difficult aspect of design. Historically, 
difficulties typically arise for practitioners 
when they attempt to formalize the more 
ambiguous constraints found in the socially 
oriented categories. We argue the established 
intellectual constructs for articulating the more 
ambiguous variety can be used to cull out 
crosscutting effects spanning constraint 
categories, which should be theoretically 
applicable to all mission-critical infrastructure 
and emergency response networks.   
The Cyberinfrastructure designer can 
use concrete resource concepts when 
categorizing constraints and reasoning about 
the interaction of constraints across categories, 
which are two conditions for sufficient domain 
representation. Concrete resources constraints 
arise from stakeholder empowerment within 
an objective perspective and vary in density 
from physical laws (e.g. E=mc2) to 
governmental policy (e.g., FERC NOPR to 
deregulate the electric power industry (1996)). 
Other “stylistic” constraints are subjective and 
tightly coupled with epistemological 
constructs used to determine what is 
“knowledge” because “Design, in all of its 
realizations (e.g., architecture, landscaping, art, 
music), has style” (Hevner, March, Park and 
Ram 2004). Stylistic views map easily into 
typical software and information systems 
architectural abstractions to enable software 
tool support.  
Generally speaking, any variety or type 
of act perpetrated by actors can explain a large 
portion of the world. This perspective 
facilitates the examination of representational 
sufficiency by establishing a consistent 
framework across all constraint types. The 
“wicked” problem of Cyberinfrastructure 
design depends on accurately capturing the 
symbiotic relationship already present in the 
domain, which is enormous when one 
considers built infrastructure such as electric 
power. Nevertheless, to design a malleable 
Cyberinfrastructure some approach must be 
adopted. As noted earlier, we think a Domain 
Specific Software Architecture (DSSA) style 
(Tracz, Coglianese and Young 1993; Taylor, 
Tracz and Coglianese 1995; Klashner 2002) 
would facilitate discovering the best “fit” 
when considering a solution to the GTTI 
problem. The concept of “domain” has been 
applied to many different levels of 
architectural abstraction (Klashner 2002) such 
as operating systems or electric power. This 
flexibility can be applied to emergency 
response, urban infrastructure, or interacting 
ICTI. Reuse was a primary motivation for 
establishing DSSA concepts that are intended 
to result in a representational sufficient 
architectural baseline. Thus, a DSSA style can 
be developed to span all constraint categories 
to satisfy the theoretical framework.  Also, the 
DSSA style can be used because infrastructure 
is often logically treated in a holistic fashion, 
with reusable concepts, that is consistent with 
systems theory upon which CAS rests.  
The requirements to solve the GTTI 
problem are tightly coupled with the breadth 
of the problem domain (i.e., anywhere people 
inhabit or travel) and the need to have complex 
sensornets for a Cyberinfrastructure. To 
address this constraint with its crosscutting 
effects, we choose to leverage the worldwide 
electric power infrastructure because it is 
ubiquitous in the sense that electrical voltage 
is never too far away from any populated 
location. Since electric power mediums can 
and will carry data (Echelon 2001), the electric 
power grids will effectively become a primary 
sensory medium. Therefore, electricity is a 
consistent resource to consider for the design 
solution. However, the designed 
Cyberinfrastructure would integrate a number 
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of existing infrastructures (e.g. 
telecommunications). The actual final system 
design would include most if not all of the 
other built infrastructures, but they have less 
scope with respect to proximity to population. 
Initial concept drawings of built 
architectural structures in architectural 
processes are rough and rarely closely 
resemble the finished product. These drawings 
serve several purposes within the traditional 
architectural process that has been 
conceptually leveraged by IS architects 
(Zachman 1987) and software architects (Perry 
and Wolf 1992; Perry 1997). The strength of 
such a process is the enumeration and 
negotiation of domain constraints that must be 
factored into an effective design. These 
approaches are synergistic and complimentary 
with IS design research (Hevner, March, Park 
and Ram 2004). 
The method should allow designers to 
capture the essence of the domain in a manner 
that is relevant to all stakeholders associated 
with a wide variety of resource allocation 
issues.  The approach is used to produce an 
accurate constraint-based design 
representation of the application domain. It 
should be able to sufficiently represent known 
domain “states” because of existing 
relationship categories that have reflective 
validity in past and ongoing domain events. 
Stylistic constraints serve to sufficiently 
represent crosscutting effects in order to 
reduce complexity. Resources, constraints, and 
views work in concert to facilitate the dynamic 
construction of a new Cyberinfrastructure to 
extend or otherwise manipulate the GTTI. We 
suggest the following utilization of resources 
and constraints to illustrate design 
functionality: 
1. Resources in the form of concrete 
constraints associated with technologies 
(referenced in the related work section): 
a. The existing and emerging 
technologies all create and function 
within a path dependent (Liebowitz 
and Margolis 1995) paradigm 
because of the scale and scope of the 
electric power industry.  
b. The Cyberinfrastructure designer 
must be cognizant of current and 
possible dependencies when 
considering the concrete domain 
resources in his\her design. 
Dependency considerations are 
important for: 
i. Evolutionary or maintenance 
requirements  
ii. Associations between constraints 
that are fundamental to the 
architecture 
2. Stylistic constraints: 
a. Are context dependent 
b. Are subjective 
c. Will be elaborated upon later in the 
analysis section 
d. Can be viewed as: 
i. Domain variety captured as data 
that is transformed into 
information 
ii. Communication carried out 
through primary connections (i.e. 
fully functional) in contrast to 
communication that is ignored, 
inferred, or mitigated in some 
manner 
We describe a small scenario next to 
demonstrate how requirements can be elicited 
to augment our Vision Statement. The more 
tangible and understandable scenario should 
also facilitate the development of 
methodologies based on the theoretical 
framework.  
AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
SCENARIO 
This hypothetical scenario is presented 
in order to bring together the many individual 
concepts presented up to now. The motivation 
for this scenario is to demonstrate how a 
Cyberinfrastructure would facilitate the 
accomplishment of the initial research 
questions. This scenario was chosen as much 
for its technical variety as for its sociocultural 
constraints, which must be considered in 
Cyberinfrastructure design using an adaptive 
method within the CAS framework. The 
scenario described here effectively juxtaposes 
current and emerging future technologies with 
the temporal constraints arising from the GTTI 
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and societal issues such as privacy and 
freedom.  
As demonstrated in the development of 
CAS (Buckley 1967; Buckley 1998), one 
cannot arbitrarily restrict the boundaries of a 
system for convenience sake because the 
systemic behavior arises from the degree of 
organizational complexity internally generated 
by the system; i.e., not externally imposed by 
the designer. We are contending that control 
must be maintained in a holistic manner under 
the rubric of information interpreted using the 
appropriate theoretical constructs. Otherwise, 
per CAS, mission-critical systems can quickly 
fail as they transform into a state approaching 
chaotic organization as noted within the 
electric power grid blackout and GTTI 
phenomena. The following scenario presents 
this balance that must be attained in the design 
of Cyberinfrastructure in order to avoid 
degradation toward chaos as massive amounts 
of domain variety overwhelm conventionally 
designed IS.  
The scenario must be contextualized, 
which is done next with a discussion of the 
CAS concepts as they apply to an emergency. 
Then, a brief history of a particular emergency 
preparedness network is introduced to help 
further ground the method presentation and 
present domain-specific motivational 
arguments. A technological component (Smart 
Buildings with there associated sub-
technologies) is then introduced into the 
emergency scenario to demonstrate the pivotal 
role a new (architectural) resource can make in 
the design of mission-critical infrastructure. 
Following this scenario presentation is the 
discussion section, which uses the stylistic 
method to analyze the emergency response 
scenario described below. 
CONTEXTUALIZATION OF 
EMERGENCIES USING CAS CONCEPTS 
When infrastructures or emergency 
preparedness networks are operating in a 
normal state and maintaining full control of 
emerging situations they exhibit a well-
organized behavior. Since they are not being 
presented with any new event variety, we can 
infer that little new information is gained 
during this situation. However, if a severe 
emergency event occurs, the source of the 
emergency event generates more variety in the 
domain than had been experienced before. 
Each entity, such as an electric power grid 
dispatch center or a hospital, receives event 
messages and interprets the variety based on 
their contingency plans, expertise, and IS 
support infrastructure (e.g., DSS) in order to 
map it into their view of the domain. If the 
level of variety increases beyond their ability 
to process it, the infrastructure or emergency 
preparedness network begins to approach the 
chaotic complexity organizational state, which 
means they have too much information or 
information overload. The normal set of 
constraints no longer correctly apply in these 
chaotic situations and information systems 
designed using traditional methods are often 
abandoned in favor of manual methods such as 
with electric power grid dispatch centers 
during a grid system disturbance leading to a 
major electricity blackout (Klashner 2002; 
Klashner 2004). Historically, there have been 
incidences where analysis of situations (such 
as battles during wars or tragedies) indicates 
the necessary data and/or information was 
available to arrive at an accurate appraisal of 
their situation, but the individuals involved did 
not receive and/or configure their information 
resources. The result was tragic loss of life 
because the variety existing in the domain had 
not been appropriately identified, processed, 
and delivered to the correct legitimate control 
entity. Analysis of the data in these cases 
shows that there was sufficient statistical 
verification of an imminent event, but 
individuals utilizing separate systems 
processed the crucial knowledge from the 
domain variety. Therefore, these individuals 
exercised their degree of freedom to choose 
appropriate contingency alternatives based on 
existing systemic constraints. The incorrect 
mapping of the variety resulted in the loss of 
human life.  Similar examples exist today in 
mission-critical infrastructure emergency 
events that threaten human life and cost 
billions of dollars. 
HISTORY AND MOTIVATION FOR A 
DOMAIN-SPECIFIC 
CYBERINFRASTRUCTURE  
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
prior to the 1970s was often provided in an ad 
hoc manner or through facilities that served 
other purposes. For example, funeral homes 
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provided the ambulance service in Texas. 
There were several significant changes in the 
US beginning in the late 1960s that established 
a modern, coordinated EMS effort (BEMTDH 
2001): 
1. Advanced trauma (i.e. injury) research, 
resulting from the Vietnam War, 
demonstrated how well-trained non-
physicians could save lives  
2. Congress passed the EMS Act of 1973 
3. American College of Surgeons developed 
a comprehensive emergency prehospital 
training program for ambulance attendants 
In the last thirty years since modern 
EMS began, two critical elements are still 
missing from most disaster preparedness 
efforts. First, hospitals need to “establish 
communications linkages among themselves 
and to share information about what resources 
are available.” Second, EMS should “deliver 
victims to hospitals with resources to meet 
their needs” (CWDMG 2003); i.e., evenly 
spread the load on the EMS infrastructure. 
Mass patient incidents (MPI) and mass 
casualty incidents (MCI) stretch the abilities of 
EMS in many communities. A MPI (e.g. a 
building fire) is distinct from a MCI (e.g. a 
hurricane) in scale and scope, but either can be 
caused by a wide variety of disasters 
(CWDMG 2003). For example, disaster types 
include:  
• Natural such as tornadoes  
• Technological as in a building collapse 
• CBNRE which stands for Chemical, 
Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, or 
Explosive 
• A National Security incident involving 
some combination of the above disasters 
The largest number of trauma incidents 
arises from daily disasters (DD) such as auto 
accidents involving small groups. These DD 
cause tens of thousands of fatalities and 
millions of injuries per year. MPI are much 
less common and constitute far fewer deaths 
than the DD. MCI are very rare and cause far 
fewer total annual trauma deaths than the other 
two types. However, MCI have significant 
psychological and economic repercussions that 
cannot easily be quantified or predicted. 
Scenario Technologies: Smart Buildings  
Future architecture will include 
intelligence in the design aspect of built 
structures. This trend is not new (e.g., see 
“e/home” product convention), but will take 
on new meaning over the next few years. A 
smart building will be controlled by ICTI that 
enables the stakeholders (e.g. owner, tenant, 
utility) to control a variety of environmental 
factors. The familiar thermostat concept can be 
extended to include all digital activity; e.g., 
appliances reacting to changing inhabitant 
behavior such as with schedules. The platform 
independent computing allows manufacturers 
to open all devices for use in a networked 
configuration within the confines of the home 
combining domestic engineering and computer 
supported cooperative work. Sensors, preset 
preferences, motion detectors, and a host of 
other devices will be configured to take full 
advantage of the structure’s design and 
occupants’ habits to achieve stakeholder 
objectives. 
A common assumption is that the 
typical home will have a wide variety of 
connectivity with the outside world (e.g. 
cellular phones, satellite dishes, DSL, cable 
with Internet modems, etc.), but due to brevity 
of this paper, the socioeconomic problems 
with this assumption will be ignored. Just as 
with most infrastructures, the intelligence in 
the appliances and structure itself may well 
become invisible to the occupants. The 
occupant may not know that the utility 
company can not only read the smart meter 
remotely, but also break down the occupants’ 
electricity consumption by device. Instead of 
merely consuming power, each home will act 
as an intelligent node on a national network of 
electric power lines (Echelon 2001). 
Metropolitan areas with intelligent 
structures/nodes scattered throughout the 
region will provide a ubiquitous sensor 
network that can be integrated into a 
Cyberinfrastructure. Faults in the electric 
power distribution (i.e. low voltage) 
infrastructure are often reported first by private 
citizens. However, in the enhanced network of 
the future, faults would be reported directly 
using the ICTI embedded throughout the 
distribution grid and in the homes. This data 
can be converted into EMS information. For 
example, after seismic sensors detect an 
Robb Klashner and Sameh Sabet 
 76 
earthquake, the information could be 
triangulated with intelligent home and fault 
data utilizing the GPS infrastructure to 
immediately indicate the areas suffering the 
most damage and in greatest need of EMS. 
Another example, in case of a fire, wireless 
thermostats and burglar systems could be 
designed to cooperatively transmit their 
current ambient air temperature, number of 
occupants, and occupant location data that 
could be rapidly simulated to inform fire 
fighters of the fire activity and possible trauma 
victims within the building(s). 
Intelligent electricity meters and smart 
devices using emerging technologies are 
already moving the U.S. toward this paradigm. 
The associated Cyberinfrastructure design 
issues of importance to the EMS community 
are intimately tied to social issues as well as 
technological aspects. Everyone experienced 
with large software system development 
understands the difficulty associated with 
integration of subsystems or components. A 
multilateral Cyberinfrastructure approach to 
support EMS will necessitate integration of 
extremely large existing Cyberinfrastructure 
(e.g. electric power, telecommunications) with 
emerging intelligent structure technologies.  
The overall “system” state indicates the 
current complexion of the domain. A domain 
state change event is a key concept from IS 
and software design that can be effectively 
utilized for Cyberinfrastructure development.  
A great deal of meaning can be associated with 
state change events if the appropriate event 
source data is captured, probabilities can be 
assigned to an event, and events can be 
triangulated. Utilizing an event notification 
infrastructure, existing IS infrastructure such 
as DSS or other stand alone tools, once it is 
integrated will be more useful to EMS 
decision-makers. Each grid state has a specific 
set of constraints. In order to react to the 
emergency event, the state must be captured 
before an emergency or dynamically adapted 
to after the event.  Interpreting event change 
data during an electric power disturbance can 
be very precise and proactive because the 
utilities have a wealth of domain-specific data 
and knowledge workers capable of intuitively 
reading the grid. Humans, unfortunately, tend 
to examine choices in isolation, maintain too 
much rigidity in problem solving, and self-
impose unnecessary constraints (Kleindorfer, 
Kunreuther and Shoemaker 1993). An 
appropriately augmented and integrated DSS 
can utilize various models, fast statistical 
computation, and the entire domain state 
change event data to counteract these typical 
human restrictions. EMS personnel in the field 
or at other nodes on the emergency response 
network could have support from centralized 
DSS that provide additional decision options 
within a Cyberinfrastructure context for 
architectural adjustments. 
Specific MPI Scenario Event 
Most DD, MPI, or MCI will occur 
where homes or commercial buildings (but not 
necessarily occupants) are present. As these 
structures evolve, the computational resources 
at each node will grow exponentially. These 
resources can be utilized if the appropriate 
Cyberinfrastructure is in place. For example, 
given the scenario that during a storm a school 
bus skids off the road and collides with a 
power pole in a suburban or semi-rural area:  
1. The bus’s onboard technologies (e.g. 
gyroscope indicating the bus had tipped) 
create a state change event. Having 
discussed the GTTI phenomenon earlier 
on, it is apparent that the appropriate 
rescue authorities must be notified and 
that the appropriate help must be 
dispatched immediately. 
a. The bus company that has relevant 
occupant information, such as  
i. Emergency release forms with 
contact information 
ii. Average number of occupants 
b. The integrated OnStar™ system 
(described earlier) automatically calls 
directly to police and fire departments 
for assistance. 
2. The accident may be captured on motion 
sensitive surveillance equipment for 
transmittal to the security company with 
live video to monitor for emerging events 
such as fire or additional vehicular 
involvement 
3. The electric power utility may be able to 
use the smart building information (as 
well as video feed) to determine the 
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probability of a power line being down in 
the vicinity to determine level of danger 
a. The utility has experts with 
knowledge of electrocution  
b. These utility experts and/or their 
DSS can approximate the severity of 
burns based on the voltage present, 
weather conditions, type of soil, etc. 
c. Hospital ward specializing in burns 
could then be put on alert  
4. Weather data gathered from smart 
buildings throughout the vicinity must be 
factored into the logistical computation to 
determine where to transport the MPI 
trauma victims based on specific injury 
types.  
a. The possibility of helicopter support 
can be factored into the calculation 
to determine how many trauma 
facilities should be considered 
accessible 
b. Closed roads and bridges due to 
flooding is automatically considered 
when dispatching the ambulances 
Authorities can automatically access all 
of this data in case of an emergency without 
the permission of the private companies such 
as the bus company or school, so that it can be 
triangulated with school medical records. 
Parents could theoretically be contacted via 
cell phone prior to children arriving at the 
facilities to clarify any ambiguities such as 
allergies to medication or insurance 
discrepancies, which has delayed trauma 
treatment in the past. This approach is 
expedient, but a major privacy consideration 
with societal repercussions. Not only are 
personal records accessible, but also utilizing 
such technologies as OnStar™, authorities (or 
worse, unauthorized or malicious users) can 
access your exact whereabouts at any time, 
tracking your every movement and even 
controlling certain aspects of your vehicle 
without your knowledge. For example, home 
burglars could know when you were arriving 
or car thieves may now be able to easily 
unlock your car by simply hacking into your 
OnStar™ controller. The OnStar privacy 
policy states that they may share your 
information with legally authorized persons, 
which may result in your privacy being 
invaded.   
The smart buildings demonstrate some 
of the technological capabilities we currently 
have at our disposal. The short MPI scenario 
event with some of the possible considerations 
was presented to contextualize the analysis 
regarding how to apply a method. Although 
this scenario has many resources from several 
different domains of concern, we will focus on 
the electric power to narrow the hypothetical 
analysis. A full analysis of this 
Cyberinfrastructure would not be narrowed, 
but encompass all applicable resources. A full 
domain analysis facilitates discovery through 
stylistic abstraction that would typically be 
overlooked in tradition software, information 
systems, or systems design efforts. 
Concrete Constraints 
A constraint analysis factors in 
expected constraints from all constraint types. 
Basically, the designers must methodically 
examine all current and near term resources to 
determine the broad constraints that will 
become applicable to the design. Each set of 
constraints adds both limitations and freedoms. 
Plant and equipment (e.g. power lines, 
breakers) is a concrete resource that is 
currently limited in mechanistic functionality. 
The future extensibility of these devices for 
their utilization as communication network 
nodes will effectively remove any and all 
telecommunication bandwidth constraints that 
may still exist inhibiting an EMS 
Cyberinfrastructure. Hardware and low-level 
software that can be dynamically reconfigured 
in response to a state change event creates new 
opportunities, but also raises reliability 
concerns due to the increased device 
complexity. These developments will coincide 
with computer hardware and software resource 
developments facilitating smart buildings 
becoming nodes on the new network. Smart 
buildings can now be configured to operate in 
this next generation grid as software resources. 
If a device or building is software enabled with 
a proprietary technology it will not easily 
interface with other devices not utilizing that 
same technology creating an additional 
constraint. But the device will also more easily 
recognize the same proprietary application, 
which may provide more degrees of freedom if 
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the technology is somewhat ubiquitous. 
Intelligent devices are not as easily integrated 
(a constraint) into the domain as their 
deterministic predecessors because of their 
possibility to produce cascading failure. 
However, market constraints resulting from 
organizational strategy (policy resource) of 
competitors will likely change in order to raise 
barriers for adoption of proprietary offerings 
and slow market penetration. Also, existing 
domain-specific electric power market leaders 
with proprietary claims will not easily change 
standards such as those created through open 
source processes (a societal constraint). 
Cyberinfrastructure designers will have to 
factor in these types of path dependency 
considerations based on their own 
understanding as professionals (social resource) 
or even governmental policies (e.g., the Justice 
Departments monopoly case against 
Microsoft). 
Security Constraint 
Increasing the number of smart devices, 
connection or access points, sensornets, 
bandwidth, and so forth increases a primary 
architectural constraint: security. There is a 
direct tradeoff between the ability to observe, 
access, sense, and extract data to achieve 
security with the level of privacy of those 
observed. Measures can be taken to help 
facilitate security given data about domain 
state changes, but these approaches will 
require much research and cooperation from 
industry. Even though resources such as a 
smart building, a bus, a database, or a hospital 
may have the aforementioned technological 
features that facilitate integration during an 
emergency, it is a stylistic choice as to how 
they will be configured. 
Software is very vulnerable. The ability 
to track activities using software creates 
opportunities for hackers to use the same 
infrastructure for unlawful pursuits (e.g., 
monitoring police movements). Laws typically 
arise from the abuse of freedoms and the 
violation of other people’s rights. Of course, 
when design constraints are legislated it 
forcibly changes the architectural 
configuration of the system. The result is a 
shift toward centralized authority. Ultimately, 
“Big Brother” could legally gather whatever 
information it wanted using the EMS enabled 
systems and justify the actions under the 
pretense of National Security (Denning 1992). 
There are always numerous examples in pop 
culture of possible scenarios for abuse of 
technology (e.g., film “Enemy of the State”, 
1998).  Certain stylistic constraints on this 
abuse of power would hypothetically work.  
For example, smart buildings could only open 
access to their data and facilities if a secure, 
encrypted signal were detected that was 
associated with a domain state change event 
directly resulting from a MPI or MCI; i.e., 
validation there was an actual emergency. 
However, it is likely with the new security 
awareness within funding agencies, there will 
be support of a new breed of more secure 
programming languages that would still 
support platform independence (a key 
constraint). 
 The final decision about what is 
secure enough rests with the high-level 
architects who depend on security engineers to 
plug the holes in the technology. However, a 
more difficult problem is how to apply the 
security architecture to a Cyberinfrastructure. 
Within the CAS framework, the stylistic 
constraints for security would likely be applied 
after a careful sociopolitical analysis wherein 
the results were presented to the architectural 
committee for further integration with other 
sociotechnical concerns (e.g., human computer 
interaction with the devices). Obviously, the 
context of these decisions are changing on a 
daily basis with emerging terrorist activity, 
and must be balanced with the full weight of 
the legal system with the appropriate human 
rights considerations—by no means a 
simplistic constraint. 
Three resource views discussed below 
have a strong influence upon design: 
epistemological distinction between data and 
information; formalized and enumerated 
resource ownership, and; formalized 
Cyberinfrastructure behavior. 
Viewing information is distinctly 
different than viewing data. There is a data 
glut in the world today, but knowledge 
workers are still unable to accomplish their 
tasks because they lack information that 
knowledge warehouses can provide if 
constructed (Nemati, Steiger, Iyer and 
Herschel 2002). The electric power industry 
and other mission-critical infrastructures are 
wrestling with a vast amount of domain data 
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that will theoretically facilitate the 
advancement of an EMS Cyberinfrastructure. 
Depending on the technology available (e.g., 
data or knowledge warehouse) during analysis, 
various conclusions can be arrived at because 
powerful stakeholders will negotiate based on 
what information is presented.  
The political aspects of resource 
ownership are tightly coupled with the actual 
requirements chosen during analysis and 
design (Markus 1983; Bergman, King and 
Lyytinen 2000). How resource ownership is 
formalized, quantified, and presented to 
stakeholders as a stylistic view will greatly 
impact the ultimate design. For example, if the 
smart buildings are shown in a very abstract 
format as part of a metropolitan network with 
generic data extractions by utilities public 
opinion may be in favor of the EMS 
Cyberinfrastructure. However, if a lower level 
view with very specific data acquisition is 
released without an accompanying effective 
resource ownership constraint mapping, 
individuals may become very hostile to the 
design. A strong resource ownership and 
service commitment provision should be 
utilized to help anchor constraints to 
stakeholders, which is part of the problem 
definition. Negotiation can proceed regarding 
formalized resources with clear commitment 
agreements.  
Capturing the requirements and 
negotiating the resource commitments both 
factor into the third stylistic view, which is 
Cyberinfrastructure behavior. Every entity, not 
just the lower level mechanistic or hardware 
devices, in the Cyberinfrastructure has an 
associated behavior that can be formalized in 
the associated domain of interest (e.g., 
engineering). Legislators (as government 
policy resources) would indirectly and directly 
constraint software development efforts with 
laws and policies. Therefore, views of the 
Cyberinfrastructure must be presented in a 
manner that transcends constraint type 
boundaries in order to eradicate ambiguities 
associated with misconceptions and 
negotiations between resource owners. For 
example, there may be very concise 
organizational models of how the hospitals and 
schools will behave, in this mini-case an 
architect must use a more flexible behavioral 
model if an effective Cyberinfrastructure 
design is to be presented to all the stakeholders 
for viewing. Of course, the specific behavioral 
models of any resource must be consistent 
with these interdisciplinary behavioral views, 
which is a major factor in the CAS integration 
framework. 
In summary, the high-level system 
designers will aggregate the lower level 
concrete constraint analyses, stylistic 
constraint analyses, and resource views into a 
holistic Cyberinfrastructure designs. The more 
detailed analyses and views developed by 
specialists will benefit the big picture 
architectural team working on the EMS 
Cyberinfrastructure at a high level. 
Juxtaposing these detailed and high-level 
perspectives enables the reduction in wicked 
problem complexity through architectural 
processes proven over centuries in other 
professions. The primary aspect of most 
design approaches that is ineffective is the 
inability to address wicked problems in a 
complex domain. The crosscutting effects 
create an interwoven web of constraints. 
Crosscutting effects from concrete constraints 
to stylistic constraints to resource views are 
inherently expected to confound design efforts. 
A design method developed to work with the 
CAS framework will provide guidelines for 
software or IS designers to manage the 
complexity inherently associated with mission-
critical infrastructure and life threatening 
situations. 
SUMMARY 
Current emergency response systems 
are built upon customized independent 
infrastructures that were developed based upon 
traditional IS design theory.  However, this 
infrastructure has proven insufficient when 
large-scale MPI or MCI disasters occur that 
require information to be collaboratively 
shared among various agencies (e.g., fire, law 
enforcement, medical, etc.) and/or mission-
critical infrastructure (e.g., electric power, 
telecommunications). To highlight this 
problem, phenomena including the GTTI were 
presented. The GTTI phenomenon 
demonstrates how the lack of ICTI augmented 
treatment will deterministically and 
exponentially increase the probability that the 
trauma injury will be fatal. We have 
generalized the GTTI phenomenon to all 
emergency phenomena in order to examine 
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infrastructural evolution using conventional IS 
design theories. The general emergency 
phenomena exemplified through constraints 
such as the inability of professionals to 
interface systems when necessary or of the 
individual systems being incapable of coping 
with unpredictable changes in the environment. 
We observed that these types of phenomena 
could cause the critical response window of 
opportunity (e.g., GTTI) to be largely wasted. 
As such we investigate the question; can 
technology be used to reduce or destroy the 
Golden Barrier associated with the GTTI? 
A “Cyberinfrastructure” could be 
conceivably assembled in the near future given 
the certain technological advancements and 
the current level of interest at funding agencies 
such as the NSF. However, a technological 
deterministic vision of the future is 
unwarranted given a myriad of sociotechnical, 
sociopolitical, and sociocultural constraints 
upon the current emergency response 
capabilities. Nevertheless, assuming these 
inhibitors can be worked out enough to create 
an operational Cyberinfrastructure, a vision 
statement was presented wherein we asserted 
that emergency response capabilities could be 
extended to a nearly omnipresent state of 
awareness of the individual citizen. This level 
of ubiquitous observation then raises even 
more ambiguous and disconcerting issues that 
cannot be addressed offhandedly; e.g., the 
privacy and freedom of the population being 
exchanged for security.  
Examining the aforementioned GTTI 
and other general phenomena, however, 
facilitates the discovery of important 
constraints that effect IS success and begins 
the discussion of some aspects of the solution 
to these problems. Social, technological, and 
domain constraints associated with unknown 
or uncommon emergency events lead to 
complex high-level requirements that combine 
to create a “wicked” design problem. We 
postulated that the design of a new 
Cyberinfrastructure is required to address 
these sort of “wicked” problems. In order to 
tease apart these constraints, we presented 
some initial questions tied to emergency 
response and the utilization of 
Cyberinfrastructure based on the vision 
statement. Namely, it will be for researchers to 
determine if Cyberinfrastructure can be 
designed to mitigate Golden Barrier 
phenomena, to overcome the myriad 
interacting constraints enumerated throughout 
this paper, to have innate awareness of 
crosscutting effects arising from domain forces, 
and to address the infrastructural complexities 
during design. 
This paper has suggested that 
emergency response systems be designed 
within a CAS theoretical framework because 
of the need to dynamically evolve IS and 
integrate ICTI to conform to the 
Cyberinfrastructure objectives. The CAS 
framework facilitates the interdisciplinary 
research of these “wicked” problems because 
it was developed from the integrationist 
perspective as a bridge-building theoretical 
construct. Therefore, it is ideal as a guiding 
construct wherein multiple diverging, but 
complimentary methodologies can be 
developed to investigate the interaction 
between Cyberinfrastructure and the Golden 
Barrier in light of broader social concerns. A 
simple approach has not and will not provide 
the solution to our questions. The CAS 
framework has the appropriate constructs to 
achieve success, if it is possible. In order to 
ground the reader, we presented some 
emergency response background information 
and a scenario wherein some methodological 
speculations could be explored. 
 We showed how the next generation 
Cyberinfrastructure has certain innate 
characteristics that can be leveraged with the 
architectural metaphor. These relationships 
can be used in future research as a means to 
reason about Cyberinfrastructure and could be 
used to address socially complicated “wicked” 
problems. The design process is illustrated by 
teasing apart a “smart” building scenario to 
demonstrate the outlined approach’s 
representational sufficiency for the emergency 
response system designs necessary that will 
likely be necessary in the future. In doing the 
analysis, a number of ethical, moral and social 
issues were brought to light.   
RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that a Cyberinfrastructure 
may soon emerge given existing technologies. 
Emergency Management System designers can 
benefit from it if appropriate theory-based 
methodologies can be brought to bear upon the 
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“wicked” sociotechnical, sociopolitical or 
sociocultural problems common in these 
domains. However, as we have shown here, 
difficult decisions must be made regarding the 
security, privacy, and degree of pervasiveness 
we are all willing to tolerate. We outlined 
some fundamental questions at the beginning 
of the paper. Without extending the current 
methodological insights presented here to 
conduct specific research, we cannot 
unequivocally answer our questions. However, 
from a theoretical and analytical perspective, it 
is possible to mitigate emergency response 
phenomena such as the Golden Barrier in 
order to save human lives during the GTTI. 
This relationship should hold true in mission-
critical infrastructure that suffer from similar 
phenomena.  
Utilizing the appropriate theoretical 
perspectives within the CAS framework will 
facilitate the resource/constraint viewpoint to 
be explored as we have alluded to in the 
scenario. It is important to take a real “life” 
cycle stance regarding evolutionary issues 
because infrastructure lasts for a very long 
time (i.e. continues to live on with us) as 
evidenced in the data from the electric power 
industry. Other proactive decisions about 
logical analysis and design processes must also 
be made in order not to be swayed with 
technological opportunities or by the 
immediate socially construed issues.  
Crosscutting domain effects within 
CAS can be theoretically described and/or 
empirically discovered given the appropriate 
perspective and access to data. For example, 
through broad empirically grounded and 
theoretically substantiated systemic design 
approaches such as those referenced in this 
paper, society can hope to grapple with the 
complexities of Cyberinfrastructure design.  
We believe attacking these complexities 
squarely with appropriate theoretical 
perspectives will guide researchers to effective 
methodological approaches that can be used to 
mitigate emergency response phenomena such 
as those arising during the GTTI. Therefore, 
we do have a possibility of mollifying 
complexities that are growing at an 
exponential rate, which correlates with 
society’s increasing dependence on ICTI. 
However, incorrectly designing, evolving, and 
depending on future technologies such as 
Cyberinfrastructure to address emergencies 
will likely push issues of complexity even 
further out of our reach—we must take care to 
insure that the “cure does not kill the patient”. 
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